

A/B, 2, 33/18

10 October 1952

Chief,  
Security Research Staff  
Chief,  
Technical Branch, SRS  
Report of Return Trip  
and

1. In view of the extreme shortage of available commercial transportation from [redacted] to the United States, [redacted] obtained permission from Headquarters, Washington, D. C. to return to the United States on [redacted] 14-B/3

2. At the time the requests were made for return via this plane, [redacted] and the writer were informed by [redacted] that the aircraft in question was a [redacted] [redacted] stated that, as far as he knew, [redacted] was bringing the ship to the United States and the possibility for taking other passengers existed.

3. Since the flight was scheduled to leave the [redacted] Sunday, 6 September 1952, [redacted] and the writer, accompanied by [redacted] went to the airport and were certified through apparently [redacted] and placed on the --- --- passenger list and boarded the plane at approximately a quarter of twelve, Sunday evening.

4.

5. At approximately [redacted] Sunday night, 7 September 1952, with [redacted] of the ship, the plane took off from the [redacted] and began the flight back. The crew consisted of [redacted]




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[REDACTED]; and two other [REDACTED] whose names are not recalled by the writer. In addition, there was [REDACTED] who had obtained permission to return to the United States on this flight.

6.





B/3

7. At a few minutes after-six on the morning of Tuesday, 9 September 1952, [REDACTED] set the plane down [REDACTED]

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
8.





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While it had been explained to [REDACTED] and the writer that this was the first trip of such a nature and it was necessary to lay on certain details for future flights, it nevertheless seemed poorly executed from a security point of view and possibly hazardous.

A [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~ A/B, 2/33/21

SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. It is an error to act upon the word of another ~~person~~ without full knowledge and details. It appears obvious that the ARTICHOKE Team would never have been sent out of the country if details of this work had been known in advance. H-  
B/3

2. There is a wide difference in the concepts of Agency-type work held by professors or individuals working in the States and others engaged in actual operations overseas.

3. In work of this type, there is an extremely wide difference between reactions of actual subjects where much is at stake (perhaps life or death) and college students or professional subjects hired for experimental purposes.

4. In work of this type, it appears that prisoners confined in penitentiaries or jails are far closer to operational subjects than either college students or professionally hired subjects. In view of this, consideration should be given to working out some sort of program whereby prisoners could be used for testing purposes ~~first~~ and research with drugs, chemicals, etc. prior to their overseas use.

5. In the opinion of the ARTICHOKE Team, the drugs used in this experiment were not successfully concealed in the liquids used. It appears that some of the drugs were bitter, some or combinations thereof produced intoxication and some clouded certain liquids.

6. It is the opinion of the ARTICHOKE Team members that contrary to the statement in the original Top Secret memorandum that the drugs were non-toxic; ~~the~~ drugs used definitely were toxic and increasingly so in greater dosages.

7. It appears that it would be best, if drugs were developed for testing, that the actual testing of the drugs be left to those who have to do with actual operations and not by those who develop the drugs. Since under this method it is too easy to develop excuses and alibis for failure of the drugs to act as claimed. This, of course, does not mean that experimental work is condemned by the ARTICHOKE Team, but a common sense approach in this direction will preclude arguments, alibis and complaints as in the recent situation.

8. As recognized by the ARTICHOKE Team and by all interested SO staff officers, when experimental work is to be performed in the future, arrangements should be made for large numbers of cases to be handled. When the work is to be done on a specific case with a specific purpose in mind, but not in the sense an experimental operation, then ARTICHOKE Team action may be necessary on one or few cases.

~~SECRET~~ B-412



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The ARTICHOKE Team is also of the opinion that to a great extent a fraud was perpetrated or at least a gross misrepresentation was made to the [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] concerning use [REDACTED] funds both at [REDACTED] and in the advocacy of this [REDACTED] expedition. Certainly results in [REDACTED] clearly established that [REDACTED] had either a total lack of understanding and a completely inadequate preparation or had made a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive. [REDACTED] drugs were not "new", were not perfectly concealable in any sense, are definitely known to be toxic, and failed [REDACTED] use of them to produce any worthwhile results whatsoever from our point of view. B B/6

The ARTICHOKE Team is absolutely of the opinion that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] throughout this operation acted in good faith and no blame should be attached to them. They co-operated and worked continuously to salvage some benefit from the work [REDACTED] a [REDACTED] B



## CONCLUSIONS

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In the opinion of the ARTICHOKE Team and in the opinion of [REDACTED] B/6 B/3  
[REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] the  
experiment in [REDACTED] involving [REDACTED] produced drugs was entirely un-  
successful. Whether [REDACTED] head of the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] B  
[REDACTED] his assistant, feel that this work was successful or not is  
unknown to the ARTICHOKE Team. However, from our point of view, it may be  
said that the results were negative and that, in general, the trip was a  
waste of time, effort and money.

However, as result of this joint operation, certain recommendations can  
be made for future activities along these lines. These recommendations are  
as follows:

1. That hereafter, no ARTICHOKE personnel should be used on ex-  
perimental work with this or any other [REDACTED] without B/3  
previous, full and detailed knowledge of the work to be per-  
formed, the problems involved, the chemicals, drugs or devices  
to be used, etc., etc. This particularly should apply to work  
involving overseas travel.
2. That, whenever possible, if joint operations are carried out, the  
group should be kept at an absolute minimum and then only those  
who are to actually work in the operation should be included.
3. As an absolute rule, women should be excluded from any ARTICHOKE  
type work or operation, particularly in overseas operations. This  
is essential for two reasons. The first is that the work is  
hazardous under certain circumstances and the second is the problem  
involving personal convenience, toilet facilities, etc., are com-  
plicated by the presence of women.
- h. If ARTICHOKE or for that matter any SO branch or division contracts  
for work to be done outside or arranges for projects to be carried  
on by outsiders, very careful and continuous checks should be  
maintained on these outside projects at all times so that this Agency  
will not be burdened with a situation such as is apparently operating  
at [REDACTED] under [REDACTED] B/6